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Evaluation of the ICON I (JNS) Control Program
Introduction
The original published proposal for "An Automatic Air Traffic 
Information and Control System" (CSL Report R-35> A. T. Nordsieek, 1953) 
furnished the basis from which Cornfield became a research model. The 
proposal described a Naval air defense system which employs automatic 
initiation, tracking, and track scratching, and suggested that, in such 
an environment, track data can be accurately produced and displayed in 
such quantities as to generate a need for automatic control. Consequently, 
it was felt that a control computer might perform many useful functions 
in the assignment and guidance of weapons.
In the summer of 1955> J» N. Snyder and L. D. Fosdick of this
*laboratory, wrote and encoded for TLLIAC a program enabling it to function 
as a control computer which performs three kinds of services: threat
evaluation, weapon assignment, and the generation of steering instructions 
for intercept vectoring, direction of strikes, rendezvous, rescue, etc. 
and return-to-carrier. Tie program is reported in detail in Report R-74 
and summarized for the average reader in R-88. It became known as the 
JNS Control Program but has been officially re-named ICON I.
In the Cornfield model of an automatic tracking and control system, 
radar data is gathered at two sites and is sent to, and automatically 
tracked by, TASC, a special purpose drum computer. The clear picture
* Illinois General Purpose Digital Computer, 1024 word Williams tube 
. memory.
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produced by TASC is displayed on 19-inch P-19 Charactrons and is sent 
in parallel to ILLIAC which, with a suitable program (such as ICON I) 
and by suitable input and output connections, becomes the major control 
function in the Cornfield complex*
When governed by ICON I, ILLIAC can control up to 128 friendly 
objects against hostile or unidentified objects whose number is limited 
only by the sorting and tracking capacity of that part of the system 
which feeds ILLIAC. The controlled objects may be ships, submarines, 
or planes, but the program is especially tailored to provide fast, 
frequent, and accurate control information for or against high speed 
aircraft; slow objects such as ships, which have more facilities for 
their own control, are dealt with in a less comprehensive and more 
leisurely way.
In the siammer of 1956 experiments were begun with ILLIAC in 
the Cornfield system, taking the form of war games which will be 
described below, designed to familiarize CSL personnel with the detailed 
characteristics of ICON I and to furnish a basis for evaluation. Since 
that time sufficient information has been gathered to support the 
conclusions presented here and to indicate the trends which improved
programs must follow. A certain insight was also gained into the
. . .
general problems of evaluation itself. A more sophisticated but 
skeletal program, ICON II, is now underway and more advanced programs 
are contemplated.
A computer program for making tactical decisions in warfare is a 
difficult thing to evaluate. The obstacles to a satisfying, objective 
evaluation, while manifold, fall roughly into two classes: the
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difficulty in aYOiding subjectivity in the judgment of tactics, and 
the difficulty of assessing the control quality alone from measurements 
taken of control system performance.• ,v‘ L- . • .
While many of the results of a prolonged interaction of intelligence, 
tactics, execution, and chance are sound, measurable quantities, it is 
quite difficult to extract from them a figure which measures the quality 
of the tactics employed. Yet, without such a figure, the appraisal 
becomes wholly qualitative and somewhat subjective.
An additional hazard lies in the choice of tests to which a 
control system should be subjected for the purposes of measurement or 
qualitative appraisal. No matter what other characteristics the 
evaluation will have, whether quantitative or qualitative, theoretical 
or experimental, it will always amount to a comparison of some sort. 
Sometimes the comparison may be expressly made, as when various tactical 
command functions are independently put to the same tests. A parallel 
of this is when officers or teams are separately examined in the same war 
game situation and their performance is compared to some function (max.,
min., average, etc.) of the history of performances of previous officers
) - .
or teams. Such a method is theoretically possible for tactical automata 
but is practically unwieldy. It is needlessly empirical and requires 
the early design of a test which will be considered realistic and 
exhaustive for all similar weapon systems, past, present, and future.
A more attractive alternative is implicit comparison, where any 
intelligently prepared test may be applied and the observed results 
compared to those which, by careful analysis of the particular tests,
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95-6 C O N F I D E N T I A L
are both preferred and theoretically achievable. Even this method, 
however, is not free from pitfalls and a number of cautions must be 
faithfully observed.
Firstly, the intelligent preparation of a test requires a 
certain insight into what constitutes good tactical performance for 
a weapon system. Yet if we knew, in detail, an excellent tactical 
doctrine, we could design an excellent tactical control program 
immediately. Instead, since we cannot immediately set down a group 
of tactical rules which are ideally applicable to all tactical situations, 
we must proceed toward that goal in iterative fashion.
A program is designed which seems, by whatever judgment processes 
can be applied in the design, to represent a satisfactory detailed 
doctrine. It is then subjected to stimuli which test its behavior 
in situations typical of large classes of realistic circumstances and 
its observed performance is compared to that which appears to be both 
preferred and physically possible. From inadequacies observed in the 
tests, further insight is gained into the necessary details of a 
complete doctrine, from which knowledge a new, improved program can be 
written.
The rate of convergence of such a cyclic evolutionary process will 
depend somewhat upon the skill and Imagination of those responsible for 
the program design and the test design, application, and analysis.
However, despite the fact that work in this field can rarely depend 
upon help from experienced tacticians, there is reason for general 
optimism because tactics is an application of game theory which has 
been practiced and studied for centuries and for which even the layman
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may have considerable rational aptitude.
The pitfalls in the method lie chiefly in the evaluation procedures 
to be employed, and their avoidance requires such things as careful 
balancing of test completeness with test economy, quantitative analysis 
of the physical limitations of the weapons system followed by intelligent 
use of this knowledge, and recognition of those sources of perturbation 
which can cause many types of measured results to be a distorted 
reflection of the tactical command function under test. Readers 
interested in further pursuing a discussion of evaluation principles 
and procedure are invited to examine the forthcoming CSL Report R-89, 
on the Design and Evaluation of Tactical Automata.
One of the difficulties in the method outlined above, that of 
successfully extracting from overall results of a war game a clear 
measure of the tact iced, control function, may be largely sidestepped in 
the evaluation of the JNS (ICON I) program because its behavior is quite 
uncomplicated. If a program is sufficiently unsophisticated that all 
its decisions in a tactical exercise can be readily predicted, then 
the value or consequences of these decisions may also be predicted, 
provided certain assumptions regarding data quality and execution are 
allowed. Thus a paper study can substitute for an engineering study; 
little, if anything, further concerning the value of the control function 
could be gained by actually running the programmed hardware through 
experimental tactical exercises.
C O N F I D E N T I A L
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Behavior Analysis of ICON I
It was claimed in the Introduction above that all the actions of 
the subject program are readily predictable and may be subjected to 
a paper study in lieu of hardware experimentation. The confidence with 
which this statement can be made is significantly bolstered by the 
experience which has been gained from a protracted program of hardware 
experiments. Experience with a working model may not reveal anything 
which could not have been predicted but often dramatically points out 
characteristics which might be accidentally overlooked in a paper 
study. It Is felt that we now have had sufficient working experience 
with, and have given sufficient thought to, ICON I to present at this 
time a just evaluation•
The medium which will be employed for some of this presentation 
is a running account of the predicted behavior of a reasonably typical 
weapon system, under the control of ICON I, as it deals with a number 
of selected situations. The situations have been carefully chosen to 
either quantitatively or qualitatively stress the control function to 
reveal its weaknesses without overwhelming the weapon system and 
obliterating whatever good qualities ICON I may possess. Let us, 
therefore, first set up a reasonable tactical disposition of Naval 
weapons and then analyze its behavior in the face of certain specific 
air threats.
Imagine a small fast carrier task group consisting of a central 
aircraft carrier accompanied by two heavy support ships and surrounded 
by a circular screen of AA ships disposed 50 miles apart on a 50 mile 
radius. Let us suppose the AA armament of the two support ships is
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100-mile Talos, each ship capable of engaging two independent targets
simultaneously. Let us further suppose that the AA armament (called 
*
"GUNS”) of the screening vessels is a guided missile of 20 mile range, 
each ship provided with installations enabling it to engage two 
independent targets simultaneously.
Figure 1.
* Snyder provided for recognition of 4 AA weapon types: TALOS, GUNS,
CAP and decked Carrier Planes. Since the characteristics of each 
weapon are chosen and preset by control personnel in ILLIAC it is 
possible to give, say Guns, the characteristics of a medium range 
missile, thereby enabling the category called Guns to actually represent 
such missiles rather than rifle projectiles.
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The major interest in the behavior of the control program is to 
see how it acts to prevent penetration of the screening circle; what it 
does against any bogeys which successfully achieve this primary goal is 
of secondary importance and, for the time being, may be ignored. It 
furthermore appears reasonable to assume that the Threat Evaluation 
parameters will be set to cause weapon assignment to take place on any 
bogey within 200 miles of the carrier if the bogey is closing.
Before we can test this setup against some imaginary intruders,
it remains to specify still more parameters, for the action of ICON I
is heavily dependent upon the control parameters chosen. In R-88 it
was shown that the known weapon characteristics, such as speed, and
range, and the limitations on the position and velocity data employed
in weapon assignment, combine to limit severely the intelligent choice
of weapon assignment parameters. Each of the weapon types recognized
by ICON I has characteristics which make its optimum employment more
or less unqiue. Decked carrier planes have the longest maximum range
but are slower than any missile and are guaranteed to have a greater
altitude disadvantage than any airborne CAP. They would therefore not
be considered to compete for assignments which are equally close to
*any available Talos or CAP. Range-weapon priorities should be adjusted
* CSL Reports R-7^ and R-88 describe the design and action of the JNS 
(ICON I) Control Program. For description of weapon assignment and an 
explanation of how Range-weapon priorities may be set up using weapon 
preference weighting functions, a^, see R-7^ PP* 111-128, R-88 p. 33
and especially R-88 Appendix II. In the process of assigning a weapon 
to a bogey, TI.I.IAC searches through every available weapon. At the 
end of the search it has stored four weapons, each the "best" of its 
type (CAP, Carrier Plane, Talos, or Gun). The final choice of one from 
the four "best” weapons is made on the basis of the Figure of Msrit 
assigned to each of the four. The Figure of Merit is of the form a^R ., 
(Footnote continued bottom of following page) C1
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in such a way that a CAP or Talos which can complete an interception 
at a greater distance from the screen will have priority over a 
carrier plane. In no case, however, should a carrier (or CAP) plane 
be allowed to attempt an interception at such a range as to interfere 
with the action of the AA missile screen. If a bogey ever reaches the 
screen, it should not be while some earlier intercept assignment is 
still in progress, thereby preventing assignment to the missiles, for 
the probability of Imocking him down with missiles in a well-deployed 
screen is much greater than a single interception can provide.
The above suggestions amount to saying that decked carrier planes 
will be used for assignments to bogeys between l4o and 200 miles only 
if available CAP are too far away or if there are no CAP available at 
all, and that no other automatic assignments will occur to decked planes.
On a 200-mile bogey (directed at Carrier) a carrier plane is a 
poor substitute for an airborne CAP with an 80-mile head start. Assuming 
equal speeds for all aircraft, the CAP, if directly in the bogey’s path, 
would complete his interception at l^O miles (from Carrier) while the 
carrier plane interception would occur later, at 100 miles. A glance 
at the construction below (Figure 2) will show that a CAP can be consid­
erably to one side of the bogey track and still be considered as at least 
an equally good choice as a carrier plane. If he is on an 80-mile station 
circle and 185 miles from a bogey who is on the 200-mile circle, he can, 
with no speed advantage, intercept the bogey at the 100-mile circle if 
the bogey flies a radial path. Actually since he has altitude and
____________________________ (continuation of Footnote from 95-10)
* where is a pre-set weighting constant for use with weapon type i and 
R ^ is a certain function of the range from the weapon to the bogey.
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Figure 2
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therefore probably speed advantage over a carrier plane, he could 
probably do as well from 210 miles (from Bogey) as any carrier plane 
could do from 200 even though the carrier plane has the great advantage 
of being on the bogey path. Therefore, when we choose our weapon 
assignment priority a ’s we shall do so in such a way that a 210-mile 
GAP (Rp_^g = 210) has equal priority with a 200-mile carrier (plane), 
the 27-mile difference between 185 and 210 mvre or less balancing the 
tracking delay and altitude disadvantage at the carrier.
So far we have discussed some special advantages and disadvantages 
of GAP and carrier planes on deck and how they interact to limit the 
intelligent choice of assignment priorities of bogeys located on range 
circles of 1^0-200 miles. It remains to discuss Talos and its priority 
relations to both GAP and carrier planes and to allow for weapon assign­
ments to bogeys in the 70-1^0 mile ranges. Clearly, any interception 
which can be completed before the bogey reaches 100 miles is outside the 
capability of Talos if its maximum range is 100 miles. However, since 
Talos has a considerable speed advantage over 600-knot aircraft and since 
we have specified that the Talos ship will be moderately close to the 
carrier, it has a clear superiority over carrier planes within its 
range. It is one of the misfortunes of coding economy, however, that 
the JNS program cannot use, in the Weapon Assignment sorting, the calcu­
lated range to the interception point. Not knowing when (or even if) a 
bogey will cross the 100-mile range circle, ILLIAC cannot safely assign 
bogeys to Talos if they are very much outside. To be safe, let us make 
the mflYlimim Talos assignment range 150 miles, then, with a speed 
advantage of 2:1, Talos will be able to complete its intercept at not
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more than 100 miles on any 130- 
mile bogey -whose path intersects 
the 100-mile circle. The worst 
case of such a bogey is illustrated 
in the adjacent diagram.
To find how the Talos assignment priority should be adjusted 
relative to that of CAP, consider the following situation illustrated in 
Figure Suppose a bogey is located 130 miles from the carrier (and 
the Talos ship), and is flying a course directed at the carrier. Talos 
could intercept him at 100 miles if the relative speeds were 2:1 in 
favor of Talos. On the other hand, a CAP plane stationed on the 80-mile 
circel could intercept him earlier if his station is near the bogey’s 
projected track. If he is off to one side so far that his present position 
to the bogey is about 56 miles, he can still intercept him at 100 miles. 
Such a CAP, at 56 miles, may therefore be considered equivalent to a 
Talos at 130 miles. If the CAP is still further off to one side of 
the bogey track (Rp^ B = 56), the Talos will be a better assignment.
Figure 3
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To find 0:
(30f  = (8o )2 + (100f  - 2(80)(l00) cos© 
0 * Cos"1 a Cos"1 .97
To find D:
D2 = (80)2 + (130f  -2(80)(130) cos© 
D =55*9 miles
Figure 4
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A similar construction can be studied for cases where the bogey is 
not on a radial path. Take the worst case, illustrated in Figure 5 below, 
where the bogey*s path just tangentially touches the 100-mile circle. A circle 
drawn around the point where the bogey’s path touches the 100-mile circle, 
and passing through the bogey's original position, will locate all points 
from which intercepting aircraft could fly this same interception. The two 
points and Cg are the possible CAP stations from which the interceptions 
could have been flown and which mark the positions of CAP which may be 
considered equivalent, in effect, to Talos at P, since they all intercept 
the bogey at the same point. From an inspection of Figure 5, it appears 
that a CAP which is nearer to the bogey than C^ is certainly better than
Talos at P regardless of bogey path, while a CAP which is further than
j
C^ and nearer than Cg nay or may not be better depending on the amount 
of closing velocity from the bogey.
C O N F I D E N T I A L
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Because of this indeterminacy we shall use the GAP distance C^B as the 
basis for comparing CAP with Talos at 150 miles. This distance turns 
out to be about 56 miles, just as in the case of the radial bogey, and
, - t
indicates that, for our particular parameters, any CAP as near as 56 
miles to a bogey is at least as good a weapon choice as a Talos at 150
■ i .
miles.
Figure 6 is a graph illustrating the weapon assignment priorities 
for the situation we are about to test and will be consulted to perform
many of the predictions about to be presented. The reader may consult
_ !CSL Report R-88, Appendix II, for a discussion of the use and properties 
of such a graph. In so doing, he will note that Figure 6 differs from 
the "preferred” arrangement shown in R-88. The writer feels that the 
present selection represents an improvement.
Having posted our ships, selected a CAP station range, and assigned 
weapon priorities, it now remains for us to actually station the CAP 
and run in some test bogeys.
Since this is a small task group, it seems reasonable to suggest 
keeping only two sections of CAP in the air if the expected attack is 
almost certainly from the forward hemisphere. These we shall station 
about 100 miles apart, straddling the forward centerline. See Figure 7* 
Hopefully, we will have some means of detecting incoming aircraft at ranges 
of more than 200 miles from the carrier. If so, a single test bogey, flown 
in along path A, will have its threat number reach assignment threshold
jfr
at about 200 miles, and will be assigned by XLLIAC to CAP section 2.
The interception should occur at about 1^0 miles from the carrier. If
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the interception misses, control personnel will be so informed by CAP 
$  2 and will
1. Change mission of CAP^ 2 from INTERCEPT-* CAP
2. Give bogey a threat1' = assignment threshold,
causing ttj.tac to perform another weapon assignment
4on the bogey and considering CAP1 2 in its choice.
Figure 7
If the range (bogey-to-carrier) is still greater than 1*40 miles, the 
possible choices will be between CAP^l, CAP^ 2, and carrier planes. 
However, since CAP^2 is most probably now behind the bogey, it will 
be ruled out because the bogey is not closing it. •CAP^ 1 and the
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carrier are approximately equidistant from the bogey at just over 1^0
*miles* ILLIAC will use these distances in choosing between them, 
considering a CAP whose range to the bogey is l’lRcarrier -bogey8“1 
equally good choice as a carrier plane at range Rcarrier -bogey* If 
CAP 1 is further from the bogey than 1*1 times the bogey’s range 
to the carrier, a carrier plane will receive the assignment; if not, 
the CAP will be assigned. Since the interception will occur at roughly 
the same place regardless of which assignment occurs, let us assume that 
the carrier plane is given the mission.
We have now arrived at another point of speculation which can 
appreciably affect ILLIAC’s actions. We have assumed above that when 
CAP 2 left its post to perform the original interception, no substitute 
was launched from the carrier. The personnel in the system should have 
noticed the incoming bogey, would have monitored the initial assignment, 
and could very well have caused a replacement section to be launched 
and flown toward the vacated 2 CAP station. If this had been done, 
the new CAP would have reached a point approximately 60 miles from the 
carrier and 1^0 - 60 = 80 miles from the bogey at the time the first 
interception missed. Being the closest CAP and being very much closer 
than (decked) carrier planes, it would certainly receive the second 
assignment, which it could have completed at 100 miles, allowing a 
possible subsequent Talos assignment. In the case where no replacement
* Actually uses an approximation, R =  x + |  (if x> y) whose error is a 
function f^ of J, and f^(^) ^ 11.7°/o. This approximation is called 
the 10°/o R.
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is launched, the carrier plane’s interception would occur at 70 miles, 
too late for a subsequent Talos assignment.
If the critical dependency upon the repeated intervention of control 
personnel can be clearly and forcefully demonstrated in a very simple 
situation, it is felt that the reader will better understand certain state­
ments made on pages 5 and 7 regarding obstacles to evaluation. The major 
difficulty to be overcame is the question of how to discount the large 
perturbations which can be caused by agents such as personnel which 
interact with the program. So far in this elementary exercise, in which 
an hypothetical bogey has been followed to the edge of the screen’s 
missile range, we have encountered a minimum of six operations which are 
required of control personnel for effective operation of the JNS control 
program. Since the quality of these manual operations will greatly 
affect the statistically predictable overall results of the battle, it
: . I : ' .is Important for us to pause a moment and notice, even at this early
!
stage, how rapidly their number is increasing.
The most probably actions which control personnel might have taken 
thus far against our hypothetical bogey are listed in the following two 
alternative sequences:
First Possible Sequence:
1. Post CAP*1 and CAP* 2
ji
2. Identify and establish voice communication with CAP^ 1 and
MrCAP'n'2 when they appear on Clear Picture.
3* Monitor failure of 1st interception by CAP*~2 at 140 miles 
and manipulate bogey’s status digits to cause 2nd 
assignment.
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k* Identify carrier plane (which receives 2nd assignment) and 
establish voice communication.
■it5. Manipulate status digits of CAP 2 causing it to be returned 
to station.
6. Monitor failure of 2nd interception (at TO miles) and 
manipulate bogey’s status digits to cause 3rd weapon 
assignment•
7. Cause carrier plane to be returned to base.
or Second Possible Sequence:
■t it1. Request CAP 1 and CAP 2
2. Identify and establish voice communication with CAP 1 and 
CAP 2 when they appear.
3* Monitor assignment of CAP^2 and request replacement CAP^ 2*.
-A-
A. Identify and establish communication with CAP 2 ’.
5. Monitor failures of 1st interception and set bogey’s status 
digits to cause 2nd assignment.
6. Cause CAP* 2 to return to station (or Carrier).
7» Monitor failure of 2nd interception and set bogey’s status 
digits to cause 3rd assignment.
8. Cause CAP^ 2 ’ to return to carrier (or CAP station).
9* Monitor failure of 3rd interception and set bogey’s status 
digits to cause H h  assignment.
Depending on which sequence of actions are taken by the control 
personnel., our test bogey, if not yet shot down, is now either at 70 
miles on the edge of the missile screen awaiting a third weapon assignment, 
or is within the screen at 66 miles awaiting a fourth assignment. In
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either case, since the screen possesses the highest priority weapon, the 
next assignment hy ILLIAC will he to that ship (missile battery) of the 
screen which is nearest to, and can engage, the bogey* In the absence of 
coordination control from ILLIAC (true of ICON l), the most sensible 
operational agreement is that this battery will assume full responsibility 
for the bogey for as long as he remains within firing range of the screen. 
It should decide what rate of fire to bring to bear and should coordinate 
the fire if the bogey’s projected path enters an area of firepower overlap.
Even though a twenty-mile missile fired from one of the screening 
vessels cannot hit bogeys at greater range than 20, It may certainly be 
fired at a closing bogey long before the bogey is inside the 20-mile 
striking range. Dependent upon the amount of overlap provided in the
firepower coverage of adjacent
missile ships and upon the 
approximate relative speeds (bogey 
vs. missile), there will be a
maximum assignment circle about
when the bogey is at will meet 
the bogey at E^. In a full scale 
AA screen composed of several ships
each screening ship which is
left, a missile fired at a bogey
considerably greater than the maximum
impact range. In the figure at the
on a circle about a carrier, the
Figure 8
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outside segments of the individual assignment circles may be connected 
to form an escalloped circle about the carrier which we will call the 
Overall Maximum Missile Assignment Range.
Figure 9
If the test bogey which we have followed through two alternative 
sequences of assignments is now somewhere between 66 and 70 miles from 
the carrier, he is well inside the maximum missile assignment range and 
there is probably not now time for three completely disjunctive, (non­
concurrent) missile shots. However, by launching a second while the
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first missile is still in the air, and perhaps launching a third -while 
the second is in the air, three shots can be achieved* If the probability 
of a kill with one shot is O.65, the likelihood of the bogey's escaping 
three shots in the screen is 0.05* The overall probability of our test 
bogey's getting past all the weapons we have discussed, and arriving 
unharmed at the inside edge of the screen is on the order of 0.007 regard- 
less of whether a replacement for CAP 2 had or had not been launched 
immediately following the CAP 2 intercept assignment. The important 
distinction between the two possibilities is the fact that in one case 
the effect of the second weapon assignment would have been known much 
earlier. In 57(*65) = 25 cases out of 100 the bogey will be killed on 
the second assignment and in these cases the earlier kill results in 
tying up parts of the defense system for significantly less time.
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One»bogey Evaluation
Weapon Assignment
The results observed in the simple gedankenexperiment just completed 
illustrate a number of key characteristics of ICOU I. The experiment 
was specific in so far as the control parameters were carefully chosen 
to match the particular weapons and deployment which we assumed for the 
task group. It was general in the respect that the particular flight 
path of the bogey was of little importance. Much the same behavior will 
be observed if the experiment is repeated with single bogeys flying other 
paths or with large numbers of bogeys which do not interact in any way.
To further substantiate the general statements about to be made, it 
is possible to run through a number of similar experiments, using 
different weapons and weapon deployments. A statistically large sample 
is not required for one to observe from these that, against one intruder:
1. The control parameters are flexible enough to provide 
reasonable weapon assignments from any reasonable weapon 
group in any reasonable deployment. The amount of intelli­
gence displayed in any single action is strictly dependent 
on the judicious choice of control parameters for the 
particular deployment. Each single action of the program 
is merely a manifestation of that behavior which is "built- 
in" by the set of chosen control parameters.
2. Once the parameters are fixed, the effectiveness of any 
single action against an intruder is then determined chiefly 
by the weapons available.
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5. The burden of providing available weapons rests upon the 
monitoring control personnel; the program relies upon them 
to think ahead in such matters as the furnishing and 
stationing of weapons.
k. The need for assignment changes must be detected by personnel 
and the changes executed via keyset.
5. Coordination of two or more weapons simultaneously against 
a single target cannot be done by the program itself. 
Coordination in the sense of weapon sequencing can be 
accomplished through the control program but only as a 
result of timely intervention (via simple keysets, etc.) 
by the monitoring personnel.
With these conclusions in mind, we may ask, "For a task group 
threatened by a single intruding aircraft, of what advantage is the 
ICON I version of automatic tactical control?" The answer to this 
question, if favorable, will lead quite naturally to "What is the 
advantage in a complex battle situation?"
To the first, the answer is apparent. Proper action of the program 
is critically dependent upon control personnel. It can do no better than 
the best that a wholly manual system can do. It can, however, perform 
those rapid calculations which are necessary to the best functioning of a 
manual system and which must often be crudely estimated; in this it may 
be regarded as a valuable assistant to the men. If, on the other hand, 
the men are regarded as the assistants, it can, with timely support, 
guarantee that a particular pre-conceived set or sequence of defense tactics 
will be carried out as conceived when the fleet deployment and control
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parameters are chosen*
While the one-bogey situation is important, it is not difficult to 
handle quite satisfactorily and is not a primary source of concern* The 
important potentialities for an automatic control system are most 
naturally to be found in the more complex, many-bogey situations where 
the numar ical calculations may be staggering for humans and the myriad 
of command and bookkeeping details strains their handling capacity*
When we have finished our remarks about the one-bogey case we shall 
discuss some more complicated situations.
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It will perhaps have been noticed that throughout all of the foregoing 
discussion little mention has been made of control functions other than 
•weapon assignment. Such other functions as are found in the ICON I program 
fall into one of t-wo categories, threat evaluation or steering instructions, 
the latter of which may be further subdivided. Of the various steering 
calculations and commands which are undertaken by the program, only those 
for directing aircraft interceptions present any challenge to the tactician 
or the programmer. The rest are simple but adequate aids for rescue, 
rendezvous, return-to-base, and designation of targets or patrol stations.
Of the vectoring control for aircraft interceptions it may be said 
that, in the ICON I
1. The quality of vectoring is independent of traffic density 
and, therefore, that its evaluation for the one-bogey test 
is not unique*
2. The vectoring sub-routines have been purposely limited in 
scope and sophistication in order to squeeze them into 
an overall control program which, for the limited memory 
space of ILLIAC, is about as close-packed as can be conceived.
3. If the intercepting aircraft carry advanced weapons such 
as Jump-up missiles and are therefore not required to gain 
a particular altitude differential nor approach from a 
fairly restricted angle, the control parameters can be set 
to guarantee good interceptions in all cases.
4. In the event of restricting requirements such as final 
approach angle and altitude, a human controller is needed
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to monitor and occasionally over-ride ILLIAC*s decisions.
In this circumstance, the control program may "be regarded 
as a supplement to a conventional air-control officer,
(or team of officers) somewhat increasing the number of 
interceptions this man (these men) can handle concurrently.
5* The original vectoring routine is not the only one which 
can be invented which will fit into the program space 
provided. Others have been written and are still being 
evaluated.
6. Finally, the ICON I program should not stand or fall on the 
quality of its vectoring routines. Since the whole effort 
of the original design was to see if tactical control was 
within the capability of general purpose computing techniques, 
it would be quite cricket to design a whole new program which 
does nothing but excellent vectoring, if its design were such 
that it could be inserted into ICON I (or II or etc.) in an 
ILLIAC with enlarged memory. This effort is nearly completed.
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Threat Evaluation
To estimate the goodness of that function called Threat Evaluation 
one must have some criterion or measuring standard and this pre-supposes 
an agreed purpose for threat evaluation. The value of information in 
•warfare is not to satisfy curiosity but to govern action. Similarly, 
threat evaluation, -which amounts to an operation on information, is 
performed to govern the special actions of weapons assignment. In fact 
some, among whom this writer may be numbered, may prefer to regard 
threat evaluation as a part of, and not distinct from, weapon assignment. 
However such an attitude is not reflected in ICON I because in it the 
threat calculation routines are all but independent; threat index is 
employed only for deciding whether or when to assign a weapon, with 
the threshold for weapon assignment the limiting value for threat. After 
assignment, threat calculations are dropped and cannot be re-instituted 
so long as the intruder is paired with a weapon.
Several variables and constants enter into each threat calculation, 
the variables defining the threatening characteristics, while the 
constants define the relative importance attached to them. The particular 
characteristics chosen for ICON I are: time-since-first-observed, proximity
to the nearest Protectee, and closing velocity (on that Protectee). A 
fourth contribution may be added by control personnel on the basis of 
signal strength, resolved raid size or other intelligence they may possess. 
Although the equation in which these characteristics are combined is 
linear, the numerical range provided in the selectable weighting constants 
permits a wide choice in the behavior of the Threat Evaluation portion of 
the program. Several modes of behavior have been tested which demonstrate
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that they can he made to serve as a simple but, for some purposes, 
satisfactory method for delaying or triggering active resistance. Consid­
erably more sophisticated schemes are being studied for future programs.
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Many-bogey Evaluation
The one-bogey stress was applied to our control system in order to 
test the reliability or wisdom of the individual actions of the system, 
when the choice of action is not hampered by competition. It was 
demonstrated that the wisdom of any action is merely a manifestation of 
whatever wisdom was applied in the deployment of available weapons and 
the choice of control parameters. Wise or unwise, the actions occur 
reliably whenever the conditions for their occurrence are present. Some 
of the conditions may be: proximity of an intruder, availability of
weapons, alertness and promptness of control personnel.
In the many-bogey case, competition for weapons and for attention 
of personnel may be expected to lower the quality of treatment which can 
be accorded one bogey and we must be very careful to separate the effects 
of these two strains. When testing a defense system it is quite all 
right to apply stresses which primarily overtax the command personnel in 
such a way that the system is personnel-limited. But one should avoid 
overwhelming the defenses of any test system in such a way as to exceed 
that inherent or ideal defensive capability which is chiefly determined 
by weapon supply, maneuverability and firepower. The personnel limitation 
may be a fault of the control program while the ultimate weapon limitation 
certainly is not. Therefore, before applying stresses which are designed 
to seriously strain a defense system, ve should conscientiously attempt 
to determine the limits imposed by the weapons themselves.
In R-89 this subject is considered in some detail and may be useful 
in weapon system planning or in quantitative evaluation of complex control
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programs* For the present report no sueh detail is needed for the simple 
evaluation which should he adequate for ICON I*
For the one-hogey stress we assumed a screen whose ships were 
distributed 30 miles apart on a 50-mile circle about the carrier. To 
avoid the detailed analyses described in R-89 we shall simply assume that 
this spacing gives sufficient overlap to guarantee three successive shots 
(on a shoot-look-shoot basis) against any bogey which flies through the 
screen. If the accuracy of the AA missile is 0*85 and the high explosive
head has a probability for inflicting lethal damage, within this accuracy,
* « of 0*75 j then the overall kill probability of a single shot is 0.85 x
0.75 = O.63. Since any missile shot has a finite probability of missing
its kill, any intruding aircraft has a finite chance of penetrating the
screen unscathed, no matter how many shots are fired at him. However,
so long as at least three shots can be guaranteed for each bogey whenever
necessary, the penetration probability will be an acceptably low 0.05*
With this in mind let us examine the behavior of our hypothetical carrier
task group when controlled by ICON I and faced with enough incoming enemy
planes to compete for assignment to the weapons available.
In Figure 10 we illustrate the task group much as we did in Figure
7. However, the screen is diagrammed somewhat differently to show its 
cellular character. In Figure 9 there are certain limiting paths such 
as A0, B0, or MO which outline the spaces through which radial bogey
* The kill probability figures employed here are not to be construed 
as accurate for any particular extant missile. Baey represent a reasonable 
guess which will serve our present purpose just as well as authoritatively 
correct values.
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paths will lie wholly in areas of independent firepower courage. Such 
an area is CDEF in Figure 9* Separating these are regions through which 
any radial path will encounter some area (such as KINS) of overlap. If 
we ignore all but radial paths we may re-draw Figure 9, in a simplified 
form, incorporating it into Figure 10.
Figure 10
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Without "flying” any bogeys against this array one observation of 
importance may be pointed out. In order to fully implement any screen 
design which, by Its minimum depth D^, guarantees three completely 
separate shots at any single bogey, some provision must be made for 
coordinating missile fire from adjacent ships when the bogey passes 
through a region of overlap. Although ICON I assumes the responsibility 
for designating all airborne targets, it does not provide for any such 
coordination. For the moment we shall merely point out this weakness 
as a problem for development in future programs and confine our 
attention to bogeys which attempt to pass through regions of single 
cover, where coordination is not required.
The following very special case is selected to illustrate one of 
the fundamental weaknesses of an unsophisticated program like ICON I. 
Consider a raid consisting of two waves of six planes each as illus­
trated in the northwest of Figure 10. Each wave, (An 0 ^ , and
B, 0 k - /;) features planes flying parallel courses about eight
miles apart. Suppose that Just prior to the raid a single target, B ,s
appears in the surveillance area to the northeast. If so, TLLIAC will
commit CAP ^ 2 to B and will do nothing to (later) change that assignment s
without human intervention. Subsequently, the radars pick up the first 
ware, fj.,2,3,^,5,6*
As drawn, plane A^ flies radial course directly toward the carrier.
He and his wing men, A,p and A^, will all pass into the same screen cell
4jrat the same time if unopposed. Since the particular bogey which CAP^ 2 
will receive for an assignment is determined, in ICON I, largely by 
chance, there is a strong possibility that this bogey will be neither
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AgA^ or A^. If the missile facilities of the ship in the cell can
*engage a maximum of two independent targets simultaneously and the kill 
probability of each shot is O.65, the penetration probability for a 
single intruder will be .05, and for two simultaneous planes will be 
2 x .05 =0.1. But the penetration probability for three will be 
considerably higher than 5 x .05« The two which are first engaged will 
saturate the facilities unless one of them is shot down, whereupon a 
weapon will be freed and can be brought to bear on the third, hitherto 
unengaged, bogey. However, at best there will be time for not more 
than two non-concurrent missile flights against him, and the overall 
chance of his getting through is considerably greater than 0.05* As a 
matter of fact, if the shoot-look-shoot rule is strictly observed, it is 
almost exactly 0.15 which gives an overall leakage probability of cell 
III for the first wave of 0.10 + 0.15 = 0.25*
Apparently, the best tactics is to treat the whole weapon complex 
as an integrated, coordinated set instead of independent subsets of 
weapon types or of individual weapons. The first line defenses, inter­
ceptors and Talos, should be employed to reduce local densities of 
incoming raids in order to prevent possible saturation of any parts of 
the deeper defenses. A slightly more sophisticated program than ICON 
I would at least review the situation from time to time and would have 
changed the assignment of GAP 2 to an assignment in the northwest 
against Ag ^  °r ^  where he could do the most good, leaving bogey
* For simplicity ignore the possibility of multiplex operation. The 
same principles apply against multiplex installations when the raid 
density is higher.
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B unopposed, if necessary, until he reaches missile range. It would also s
have made sure that CAP^l would he directed against A^, Ay  A^, Bg, B^ or 
B^ rather than A^, k y  k y  B^, B^, or
The example under discussion has so far not taken account of Talos.
In order to illustrate the particular weakness we wish to point out, we 
can keep the example as it is and ignore Talos, or increase the hogey 
density sufficiently to saturate Talos. In either case the result will he 
the same. TT.T.TAf? will fail to treat the situation as anything more than 
a collection of independent hogeys, unrelated to each other and related 
to certain weapons only on a 1:1 basis. It will fail to foresee the 
possible saturation of any cells in the medium range missile screen and 
w i n  not change any of the bogey-CAP or bogey-Talos pairings which it makes.
The example was chosen to illustrate one aspect of the fact that 
ICON I often cannot make intelligent use of a weapon system. In making 
an assignment it takes a very narrow view of a tiny portion of the battle 
situation. Against each individual bogey, taking one at a time, it 
assigns one available weapon which will make a good (and early) match 
for him, and these simple pairings are never undone without human 
intervention. Other aspects of weapon coordination and integration could 
be exploited in a sophisticated program and might be studied with simple 
models like the task group described above. It does not seem necessary 
to pursue the matter further for ICON I.
A simpler weapon system which has been studied in the Applications 
*Research Division of the Naval Research laboratory employs only a single 
* Systems Analysis Branch, H. W. Sinaiko and E. P. Buckley
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weapon type and provides an excellent model for displaying numbers of
undesirable characteristics. In the absence of confusing numbers of
tracks and confusing types of weapons these same weaknesses show up more
starkly than in a more typical fleet situation. In this model, exactly
three combat air patrol craft are airborne at all times to defend a ten-
omile circular target area. The patrol stations are located at 120 
intervals around a 30-mile circle concentric with the target. In our 
use of the model the following rules pertained:
1. Organization. Enemy targets are inserted, via 15J1C 
simulators, into the Cornfield radar data processor, sent 
to, and automatically tracked by, TASC. The clear picture 
produced by TASC is displayed on a 19-inch P-19 Charaetron 
and is sent in parallel to ILLIAC which, by suitable input 
and output connections, becomes the major control function 
in the Cornfield complex.
One man, seated at the 19-inch display, assumes overall 
tactical responsibility, monitoring ILLIAC *s actions, and 
exerting tactical command with the help of one air control 
monitor and a keyset operator.
Two 15J1C "pilots” fly CAP under the control of ILLIAC 
and the air control monitor.
An enemy coordinator plans and executes his attacks with 
the help of two or more 15J1C operators. The only restrictions 
on his operations are described in rules 2. and 3* below.
2. Surveillance Range is limited to 120 miles. Enemy raids 
may be initiated anywhere between 120 and 90 miles from the
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center of the protected area.
3. Traffic Density is limited to a maximum of nine tracks^ three 
of -which are CAP. This allows the enemy a maximum of six 
bogeys at one time, but a further restriction permits only 
three of these to make a persistent attempt to penetrate 
the 30-mile CAP circle.
Manual Intervention is restricted to allow ILLIAC free 
rein, within reason. An interception is terminated only 
if
(a) it is successfully completed 
or when (b) the bogey is outside the 60-mile circle and 
has no closing velocity.
No assignment changes other than those connected with (a) 
and (b) are permitted except changes In CAP station.
In this or any other model, against many bogeys, ICON I's vectoring 
shows no change in quality from that of the one-bogey case. In the 
assignment of weapons, the simple model is sufficient to show up three of 
the program's four basic shortcomings, for examples of these appear 
whenever manned interceptors are controlled:
1. Crossed Assignment. There are occasions when it would be 
desirable to exchange assignments between two interceptors, 
to provide one or both with an earlier interception. The 
inability of the computer to make any change in assignment 
leads to two special problems (l. and 2.) for the multi­
bogey case. These situations are not sensed by the computer 
and any change of assignment must be done manually.
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2. Decoys> The program is particularly vulnerable to decoys 
■which head for the target to obtain a weapon assignment and 
then turn aside, drawing the paired interceptor away with 
them.
3* Intercept Sequencing. There are some occasions when an 
interceptor could come into range of several bogeys, one 
after another, such as by flying down a string formation.
The program does nothing to either accomplish or avoid such 
contingencies•
Like the fourth weakness (in weapon coordination) already discussed, 
these three stem from the same two facts: the computer, through its
ICON I program, can never consider the overall situation, nor any fraction 
of it greater than one bogey and one potentially, or actually, paired 
weapon; and the computer can never on its own initiative undo any action 
it initiates.
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Concluding Remarks
It is believed at this laboratory that in any realistic fleet 
situation there will be a need for periodic reconsideration of weapon 
assignments and that any effective control program must have this ability#
It is foreseen that the provision for such a feature must be accomplished 
in such a way as to avoid unstable or oscillatory behavior.
The ability to reconsider will avoid, among other things, many of 
the decoy traps to which a naive program is vulnerable. A type of 
assignment not found in ICON I could also assist in this function. Such 
a special assignment might take the form of a guarding maneuver similar 
to the defensive shift of football.
An ideal program should employ its weapons as a coordinated complex 
rather than as a population of independent types or individuals. Numerous 
opportunities for coordination and teamwork and for the avoidance of 
interference present themselves in the course of a battle. Even among the 
fixed defense there is often need for coordinated fire and for target 
hand-over. At the very least, when fast, highly mobile weapons or 
platforms are operated outside a fixed perimeter defense, they should be 
employed to reduce local densities of intruders in order to minimize 
saturation of any of the cells of the fixed perimeter. ICON I cannot do 
anything of this sort because it does not predict, does not reconsider, 
and recognizes neither pattern nor any subset of group characteristics (such 
as density, centroid, parallel courses, etc.) Future, sophisticated prog­
rams must employ some measure(s) of the overall situation and avoid treating 
area situations as though they were equivalent to the sum of the individual 
situation elements (individual bogeys and pairs).
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With its strong dependence on personnel to control the availability 
of weapons, to change or terminate assignments, and to prevent assignment 
saturation of surface-based weapons, ICON I cannot be justified as anything 
more than a first demonstration of the feasibility of automation in 
tactical control and a guide to future programs. To justify its existence, 
an operational program must handle simple situations with much greater 
sophistication, or it must satisfactorily handle much higher traffic densities, 
than humans can. Since the ultimate goal is a program to handle high 
densities with great sophistication, it is important to accomplish the 
divorce from dependence upon personnel early in the course of program 
evolution.
While it is believed that automation of tactical control can and 
should be designed so as not to depend upon intervention by control personnel, 
it should be understood that this does not imply that automation should be 
independent of humans in the sense of not being subject to their command 
during action. So long as men are held responsible for military action and 
so long as there remain any control functions which might occasionally 
profit from refinement by human intervention, control computers should be 
programmed to work efficiently with or without humans. When controlled 
by ICOH I, most actions of TT.T.TAf? can be anticipated or countermanded by 
personnel, either by changing the clear picture information being sent 
to UXIAC or by changing parameters or orders in the program itself. A 
well-founded objection to ICON I is that too many classes of interventions 
require changes in the program, a method which is inherently awkward.
For those interventions which can be accomplished by a change in clear 
picture information, the present facilities indicate that, in spite of
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the ever-present desire to minimize equipment size and complexity, a 
certain amount of extra instrumentation will he highly desirable if it 
significantly facilitates manual intervention. Anything which can be 
done in program design to permit extensive use of pointers or hooks and 
other highly human-engineered controls for identification, scratching, 
or insertion or extraction of other information will pay substantial 
dividends in operational value.
Toward better tactical automation, present work at this laboratory 
is being directed along three main lines. A new program, ICON II, has 
been written to study some techniques in re-assessment and re-assignment 
for a single weapon type. Basic thinking is being applied to the 
fundamentals of tactics, and terms such as "threat” are being carefully 
defined in order to achieve an intelligent understanding of the proper 
use of threat estimates and means for their accurate calculation in 
future programs; advanced sorting techniques for weapon assignment are 
being sought for practical reduction to automation. Finally, an 
advanced vectoring program to provide accurate, stable mid-course 
guidance and to guarantee specified final approach attitudes and 
altitudes is almost completed.
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